The 2016/17 season could have been a special one for Arsenal. Arsene Wenger surely thought so in the summer leading up to the league season. At this time last year, the Gunner’s manager had already signed midfield destroyer Granit Xhaka, Japanese born forward Takuma Asano from Sanfrecce Hiroshima, and had only just signed Bolton’s brightest young talent from their Championship relegation campaign of the year prior, defender Rob Holding. Though most fans were aware that the club was looking for a top class central defender to complete their summer haul, Wenger was telling reporters that he believed that his team was good enough to make a legitimate title challenge.
After the opening match at home against Liverpool, a thrilling 4-3 loss, Arsenal would not lose another match until November 30, in a League Cup match against Southampton. Their next loss in the Premier League wouldn’t come until two weeks later against Everton. Approaching that match and the looming festive season, Arsenal were in first place and Arsene Wenger could have been forgiven for feeling as though he did have a legitimate title contender on his hands. It was that December 13 match that marked a clear turning point in the Gunners’ season, and whether they had been figured out by other teams or just lost confidence, they would soon find themselves dropping out of the top spot in the Premier League for the rest of the season.
The Problem
As I first stated in Part 1 a week ago, Arsenal became extremely one dimensional in attack after Santi Cazorla went down with his nagging Achilles injury in October. Without the diminutive Spaniard, Arsenal’s delicate balance in the centre of the park was shattered, with Wenger struggling to find a reliable partner for Granit Xhaka. The Swiss midfielder had really started clicking with Cazorla before the latter’s injury, his metronomic control of the midfield a perfect compliment to his teammate’s creativity.
With his incredible passing range and football intelligence, Xhaka is nearly perfect for a holding midfield role, but his lumbering gait prevents him from being able to change his passing angles on the dribble. Pairing him with Francis Coquelin and Mohammed Elneny yielded unpredictable results, with the midfield’s attacking contribution stagnating to the point of invisibility, as Coquelin in particular struggles when asked to link the ball, played out from the back, with his more creative attacking teammates. Aaron Ramsey, thought by some to be the most natural partner to Xhaka, was in the midst of an injury riddled first 3/4 of the season, and even when back for a run of games as he was, briefly, in December and again in January, he was far from the unstoppable force he was with Wales at Euro 2016 and would be again to close out the season.
Added to Arsene Wenger’s midfield woes as winter hit was the undeniably porous Arsenal backline. Despite George Graham disciple Steve Bould’s presence as assistant manager and organiser of the defence, Arsenal under Wenger have not been known for their stifling defence since the Invincibles’ back line broke up over a decade ago. Serie A clubs from the ‘90s and ‘00s would be dismayed by some of the defensive displays the Arsenal faithful have been treated to since the Emirates opened with the club in the midst of transitioning into their Barca-lite guise.
Despite these organisational flaws, what truly scuppered Arsenal’s defensive might in 2016/17 was their crippling susceptibility to counter attacks and a combination of poor alignment and rotten luck on opposing set pieces. Both in Arsenal’s 2015 very standard interpretation of a 4-2-3-1 and 2016’s blend with 4-4-1-1, the full-backs were given free license to roam forward and combine with the midfield whenever they saw fit (which they always took). This certainly gave Arsenal the advantage of numbers to create overloads in wide areas, looking for a lane to drive a low ball across the mouth of the goal to a streaking teammate but left them severely outnumbered on counter attacks. Even with Hector Bellerin’s near Olympic-level pace, full-backs are going to struggle to get back and defend from the opposition’s goal line.
Despite the attack still being effective for most of the season, Arsenal really struggled against big, physical sides that were willing to play for a goalless draw and had the discipline to stay compact for 90 minutes. The team also tried to set up for counter attacking football against the better clubs, often conceding too much possession while lacking the organisation and grit necessary to shut down other teams. These kind of reactionary tactics did not sit well with some supporters, as many felt the team now had enough quality to impose itself on matches against rivals.
With Mesut Ozil’s form deserting him for much of the winter, the attack started to stutter, as Wenger’s decision to push Ozil forward and highlight the attacking abilities of his two stars had lost half of its spark. The attack began to funnel almost entirely through Alexis Sanchez, relying on Theo Walcott and Alex Iwobi to try and chip in creatively. Given the struggles in defence, the lack of creative spark in the centre of the pitch, and a one-dimensional attack, the team’s rapid mid-season loss of form becomes a bit more understandable.
An Unexpected Solution
The first time Gunners took the pitch in a 3-4-2-1, a mid-April match against Middlesbrough, many fans were taken aback. Even though fans had been desperately suggesting a radical change for some time, few were convinced the stubborn Frenchman would be capable of making such a change. Even during the Banter Era, Arsenal still had an abundance of creativity and talent in the midfield, but in 2017, without the injured Santi Cazorla in the squad and Mesut Ozil’s role as a midfielder abandoned as soon as the Gunners lost the ball, the midfield was being consistently overrun.
Though the 3-4-2-1 technically moves a player out of the central midfield, Arsenal needed another central defender to cover for their marauding full-backs. With Shkodran Mustafi injured, Laurent Koscielny moved into the centre and was flanked by Gabriel and Rob Holding, with immediately positive results. The team was allowing 1.3 goals a game before Wenger made the switch, and in the seven matches immediately following the move proceeded to allow only four goals. The defensive shape, now with five in the backline, improved dramatically.
Despite only having two central midfielders in the new formation, the return to health of Aaron Ramsey also meant the return to a regular, more defined role for Granit Xhaka, who had to shoulder more attacking duties when paired with Elneny and Coquelin. Ramsey would begin to function in an increasingly free role as the season reached its climax, eventually stretching almost into a support striker role. When the opposing team had the ball in the Arsenal half, often one of Arsenal’s very mobile centre halves would pinch up into the midfield to snuff out passes and close down attackers, creating a multi-layered approach to the team’s defence.
One of the most unique benefits of the 3-4-2-1, made possible by the width offered by tireless wing backs, is the inclusion of two creators in advanced attacking areas. Given Mesut Ozil’s absolute mastery of the half spaces, in which he can float between the lines to pick out teammates with his pinpoint passes, and Alexis Sanchez’ tireless running and attacking cheek, Arsenal had near limitless options with which to attack their opponent. Danny Welbeck offered less in the way of clinical finishing in his role as the central striker than had Sanchez, but his pace and respectable size were very important, along with Aaron Ramsey’s slashing vertical runs, in creating the space on the edge of the box for Ozil and Sanchez to work their magic.
Given the drastic nature of the switch, the team sacrificed a good bit of fluency in attack, not bearing much resemblance to the slick and confident group we saw through the beginning autumn with Santi Cazorla pulling the strings, resembling instead their more orderly and industrious rivals, Chelsea in their slightly rigid (but make no mistake: devastatingly effective) interpretation of a similar 3-4-3/3-4-2-1. In fact, it wouldn’t be until almost a month later, against Swansea, when Arsenal would finally score more than 2 goals in their new formation.
Arsene’s Attacking Amoeba
By the time Arsenal got to the FA Cup semi final, the team had hit its stride in their new formation, and instead of looking like a totally different team than their usual fluent selves, it looked as though Wenger had succeeded in Arsenalising the formation into something of a hybrid. In the Cup final against Chelsea, Arsenal took it to the favorites, beating Antonio Conte’s Chelsea with a dose of their own formation, done better.
Arsene Wenger and Antonio Conte’s interpretation of the same formation is as different as the managers themselves. Whereas Conte is reliant on both a striker capable of holding up the play in isolation, waiting for support to arrive, as well as a central midfield pairing with almost super human work rates to cover the vast amount of space through the middle, Arsene Wenger deploys Granit Xhaka as a single pivote in attack. This gives him the space to orchestrate from deep, while Aaron Ramsey continuously looks for space to run into and sometimes even sets up on the shoulder of a defender, leaving room on the edge of the box for Ozil and Sanchez to work the half spaces. For a formation that looks on paper to scatter most of the players to the extremities of the pitch, it was very effective at getting more players involved in the scoring, allowing them to arrive in dangerous areas at just the right time.
Sticking With It
As part of Sir Alex Ferguson’s 26-year reign as the manager of Manchester United, he was forced to adjust to a massive influx of continental tactics and ideas, many of which, including the three man midfield, put the fiery Scot in danger of becoming obsolete in just a few short seasons. Like all great managers, he adjusted, eventually evolving to a point of near limitless tactical flexibility. Fergie had a deep squad throughout most of the ‘00s, and took advantage of this by deploying whoever would work best, wherever he would be most effective in order to win the match. Whether that meant putting a striker in the midfield, or a fullback at forward, he would do it.
Arsene Wenger himself has grown more pragmatic over the years, despite it not being immediately obvious in his tactical stubbornness in years passed. The Frenchman will never change his fundamental beliefs about the game of football, but he has assembled an extremely deep and talented squad that will be capable of winning matches in just about every way possible. Whether it is the plan B of Olivier Giroud at striker, or its the positional versatility of many newer Arsenal signings, Wenger has shown an increased desire to vary his team’s approach.
The signings of Sead Kolasinac and Alexandre Lacazette both point towards the club continuing in the 3-4-2-1 at least to begin the new campaign. Kolasinac might have walked into the Arsenal weight room on day one as it’s strongest player, but he is equally adept at playing at full-back or wing back as he is on the left side of a back 3. In matches with dangerous attacking opponents, the team can opt for 3 true centre backs and the sturdy Kolasinac at wing back, or they could move him into the back line in favor of a more attacking option at wing back, like Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain. Lacazette himself is a forward capable of playing in multiple positions all over the front.
Given the team’s rapid improvement at the end of last season, it would be foolish for Wenger to switch back to the 4-2-3-1 at this stage. Arsenal were able to combine a newfound defensive solidarity with an eventual return to their patented flamboyant attacking style. After adding a top quality defender and attacker, and the club rumoured to not be done with their transfer business, Arsenal will undoubtedly be one of the most exciting in the league this season. Even more exciting, should Arsenal avoid a mid season swoon, we could be talking about Arsenal as a legitimate Premier League title contender.
Receive a digest of our best Arsenal content each week direct to your mailbox
